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ABSTRACT

An emphasis on logic is the basis of argumentation theory and practice, both past and present; the policy systems model of debate--which is based on the assumption that argumentation is a means for injecting rationality into choice--sharpens and clarifies traditional ideas and suggests significant new approaches, while retaining existing principles. Rational decision making may be divided into two categories: single value choice and multivalued preference. Single value choice involves questioning whether the system can promote the goal, the extent to which the system achieves the goal, how long it takes to achieve the goal, and relative costs, consequences, and concomitants; multivalued preference differs only in complexity. Barriers to rational preference include information gaps regarding crucial information, theories, causality, or predictable outcomes, as well as inherent human limits. The argumentation process is accomplished by identifying areas of agreement, isolating areas of disagreement, offering quasi-logical arguments, seeking to predict the outcome of future events, and allowing the audience--the advocate, the opponent, the judge, or a universal audience--to check the method of the advocate. The style of public debate and tournament debate should be essentially the same. (GT)

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POLICY SYSTEMS DEBATE: A UNIVERSAL PARADIGM OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY

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POLICY SYSTEMS DEBATE: A UNIVERSAL PARADIGM OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY

by Daniel M. Rohrer*

Introduction

With the rise of modern technology, transportation and mass communication, competitive debating has expanded its forum to include two very different styles of communication: public debate and tournament debate. Public debate, whether it takes place before high school assemblies, audiences on the college campus, local social, civic or political groups, or in the media, seems to emphasize clarity, persuasion, an effective speaking style and audience adaptation.

Tournament debate, on the other hand, has become much more specialized and technical in the nature of its process and attempt to impress a judge who is supposedly well informed on the subject matter of the debate, as well as on the theory and method of academic debate. In this milieu, participants very often subordinate the qualities most characteristic of public debate and instead concentrate on disseminating as much information as possible, hoping the judge will construct a meaningful context for its application and comparison of alternative positions advocated by the teams in competition with each other.

*Professor Rohrer is Director of Forensics in the Department of Speech, Communication and Theatre at Boston College. This article constitutes an expanded version of a paper presented at the SCA National Convention on November 5, 1978. Much credit for the thought behind this work is due Allan Lichtman of The American University, and William Reynolds of The George Washington University. 3

Due to the preponderance of information in a typical tournament debate, an effective organizational structure is necessitated. And due to the technical aspects of this type of debate, the organizational structures employed most successfully are highly complex, with many subdivisions, etc. One result of this approach is the graphic comparison performed by the student on his "flow chart" of both the structure and content of the opposing side's position. In addition to the obvious organizational skills and evidentiary abilities, which the student gains from this approach, there is perhaps a more significant lesson in relation to professional life. This is the student's ability to recognize that both the structures and procedures employed in organizing information may determine its effectiveness.

In all forms of debate, the analysis of the debater in his own presentation and that of his opponent is given a primary role. The impact of analysis in debate, while occasionally involving evidence, is more likely to be in the analysis of argument construction. For the very reasons that a law of good intent may be ineffectual, so to are debate arguments. As in the example of poor law, when the intent is not put forward accurately, both in terms of what it excludes and what it attempts to control, a debate argument may fail if its structure does not allow it to be applied liberally to the very points it seeks to answer.

It is apparent that the tenor and pace of the two debate forms are widely divergent. However, a tournament debater, used to rapid argument and conditioned to rigorous time constraints, can analyze more quickly his strength of argumentation in a public debate than can his public debate trained opponent, who is more accustomed to the relaxed atmosphere of public debate.

The effectiveness of the tournament debater's analysis in a public debate remains dependent on his persuasive ability. Thus, in this area of persuasion, the public debater maintains an advantage. However, if the tournament debater's attitudinal aversion to slowing down his rate of speaking could be overcome, he would be more effective in a public debate than would a public debate trained speaker. A major reason for this observation is again the speed and constraints of tournament debate. As a result of these limitations, a tournament debater must possess economical word usage for such an approach will serve his ends more efficiently and effectively than will speaking rapidly. In a public debate this economy of language would augment the clarity of the tournament debater's arguments, and thereby achieve for him a greater measure of audience perception and understanding.

This work will focus on the logical and communicative aspects of competitive debating, concluding that the styles of tournament and public debate can and should be essentially the same. It will also discuss the relative merits of emphasizing logic as a means of both elevating and enlightening the speaker's audience, as well as procedures

by which such objectives may be pursued through a fine combination of rhetoric and rationality. While argument as logic will be the focus of this work, it is suggested that competitive debate before audiences is the best means of enhancing polished rhetoric and persuasive argumentation, and that diverse judging panels will also better facilitate such ends within the context of tournament debate.

It will further be the position of this work that tournament debate and public debate can best compliment each other while better tempering the needs of the debater and advocate by pursuing the American Forensic Association "Debate Program and Debate Tournament Standards for Colleges and Universities", as well as the "Code Amendments" embodying resolutions passed in the AFA business meeting during the December 1977 Speech Communication Association National Convention. The relevant AFA standards are as follows:

A director of debate should seek opportunities to place his debaters and speakers before audiences in the community to speak on relevant local, state, or national issues about which the students have adequate knowledge and commitment. No student should be coerced to speak in public in favor of a position which he personally opposes. The debate program also has a responsibility to the campus community to facilitate conflict resolution by means of providing a forum for dissent on questions critical to the campus community.¹

The relevant 1977 AFA Code Amendments are as follows:

Tournament managers should consider the use of speech communication and subject matter expert judges (lay judges) in addition to directors of forensics and their assistants (coaching judges) in seeking qualified judges for their tournaments and that participants should be notified in tournament invitations of the nature of judges to be used.²

Logic as Persuasive Argumentation

It is the presumption in this work that an emphasis on logic has been the traditional means of all argumentation, and that logos more than ethos and pathos is the essence of argumentation theory and practice, both past and present. Indeed, A. Craig Baird stated this observation succinctly in the words which follow:

Argumentative writing and speaking, whether general argument or specialized discussion or debate, is primarily logical rather than emotional communication. Although representative techniques of communication by language are involved in argumentation, reason predominates. The old admonition to judge a debater by his skill in evidence and argument more than by delivery or language still holds. The audience, speaker, occasion, and subject in which argumentative discourse functions assume that rational treatment, intellectual exchange, and logical conclusions should prevail.³

Reminding the reader that "the more things change, the more they remain the same", Gerald H. Sanders, President of the American Forensic Association, suggests that Baird's view has not changed in the following three decades. Sanders "submits that the argumentation and logic paradigm is an excellent one for judging academic debate".⁴ Traditional argumentation theory would serve Sanders' position well for it is unable to evaluate disparate values and goals; it provides means neither for trade-offs among different consequences nor for the integration of probabilities into policy analysis; it employs primitive and haphazard models of preference and probability; and it fails to understand the indispensable unity of a policy system, leading to the creation of false issues and irrelevant pleading.

On the other hand, while the policy systems model, which will be outlined in the following pages, does not discard existing principles, it sharpens and clarifies traditional ideas and suggests a number of significant approaches not considered in traditional theory of argumentation. This synthesis of decision theory employs refined concepts of utility that assault some of the most entrenched problems of preference analysis. It suggests a means of rating alternative values that specify precisely their utility to the decision maker, and it provides criteria for evaluating trade-offs among them. It draws upon contemporary notions of probability which permit the integration of value and uncertainty, facilitating a preference choice which considers both the importance of alternative

policy consequences and their likelihood. It further offers to argumentation a repertoire of techniques for untangling the twisted threads of causality by evolving a methodology for expressing preference in terms of growth maximization and providing argumentation with an alternative to its traditional problem-solving approach. The new argumentation assumes that when prejudice and bias invade decision analysis, its validity is necessarily undermined for its methodology fails to provide self-corrective mechanisms.

Argumentation can, however, serve to correct such deficiencies. First, it provides a mechanism for correcting distortions which stem from bias and prejudice in the analyst. The advocate, under the policy systems approach, should never explore nor give expression to ideas in a vacuum. His thought and expression should be controlled rigidly by the dynamic interaction among himself and four audiences which will be discussed later. Briefly, he must be prepared to advance and defend his contentions first against himself, second against an actual opponent of the opposite disposition, third before an hypothetical, universal audience of rational judges, and finally before a particular audience of real people who are motivated not only by rational considerations but by self-interest and psychological drives. All these audiences combine to expurgate the prejudice and bias which inevitably influence the initial argument. The reason is clear: Advocacy before the four audiences exposes the advocate to

personal and public censure and ridicule when his ideas are not sound and his utterances not responsible. Confronted with these pressures, the individual, while admittedly and necessarily irrational to some extent, tends to purge his audience through rational discourse from his own personal prejudices and biases.

Assuming that decision theory encompasses the best methodology for making a choice, for lack of a better alternative, individuals forego adherence to this methodology not because of a rational commitment to alternative techniques but because of the dominating influence of psychological motivations. However, when the individual is compelled to confront an opponent and seek the adherence of the universal and particular audiences, the desire to avoid defeat and humiliation should compel him to employ the best available methods despite the influence of contrary drives. Thus, the unification of argumentation and decision theory enhances significantly the prescriptive value of powerful decision models.⁵

Criteria for Policy Debate

Criteria for policy debate transcend substantive distinctions between tournament and public debate. The theory assumes the necessity for rational preference in policy decisions. It holds that argumentation is a means for injecting rationality into choice. This thesis makes the assumption that decisions on matters of public policy should strive for rationality which is the product of joint


measurement and evaluation of competing policy alternatives. It further assumes that argumentation promotes a means for rational decision making.

I. What is rational choice?

Speaking practically, the process of decision making is inordinately complex and cannot be fragmented. For clarification and illustration, however, problem solving or rational decision making will be discussed by dividing the process into two separate categories. First a process in which only a single goal is perceived initially will be considered, and then a process in which a multiplicity of goals are perceived initially will be viewed in terms of standards for policy debate and problem solving. The process of decision making through the analysis of a single goal may include the following factors:


A. Single Value Choice.

1. Can the system promote the goal? This question involves preferences made on the basis of capacity of the system to approximate goals. A rational decision maker must first attempt to ascertain whether competing alternatives have the capacity to promote a given objective. If one of them does and the other does not, he will accept the former and the decision can be made at this point. Hence, system "X" in the following diagram should be adopted because it can approach the goal in contrast to system "Y" which cannot do so:




If, however, both systems have the capacity to approach the goal, a series of questions must be asked:

2. To what extent does the system achieve the goal? This question involves preferences made on the basis of the degree to which goals can be approximated. Granting that two systems have the capacity to approach a given goal, the analyst must scrutinize the extent to which this capacity can be actualized, favoring the greater extent of the advantage. Thus, in the example below, system "X" is preferred over system "Y" because it promotes the goal to a greater degree:




3. How long does it take to achieve the goal? This question involves preferences made on the basis of the time required for a system to approach a goal. In some cases it may be meaningless to consider the extent to which a goal can be promoted without viewing

it in the perspective of time, and in other cases time should become a consideration if both systems can approximate a goal to the same degree. Consider the following diagram for approximating a goal on the basis of both extent and time:




4. What are the relative costs in promoting the competing goals?

This question involves preferences made on the basis of cost. Another criterion of expediency which can be derived quantitatively, and which may play a role in the ultimate policy decision, is the cost of each alternative. If all other variables are equal, the amount of resources necessary to best promote the goal will become paramount. Therefore, in the illustration below, system "X" is more desirable than system "Y" because it is less expensive:



5. What are the consequences and concomitants? This question involves preferences made on the basis of consequences and concomitants. These are the residual effects which the operation of promoting one goal have upon other goals. Their manifestations may be either positive or negative, such as added advantages or disadvantages. The following model completes the illustration:



B. Multivalued Preference.

The models discussed above are at play in evaluating systems involved with multiple values. The only difference is one of complexity. Charles E. Lindblom has attempted to simplify this complexity in theory by suggesting the following argumentative and problem solving sequence:

1. Faced with a given problem
2. a rational man first clarifies his goals, values, or objectives, and then ranks or otherwise organizes them in his mind;
3. he then lists all important possible ways of-- policies for--achieving his goals
4. and investigates all the important consequences

that would follow from each of the alternative policies,

5. at which point he is in a position to compare consequences of each policy with goals

6. and so choose the policy with consequences most closely matching goals.⁶

A more comprehensive elaboration of both the single value and multivalued preference approach to policymaking and advocacy may be found in a combined reprinting of five articles entitled: "Role of the Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of Academic Debate."⁷ The traditional problem-solving approach may be found in John Dewey's How We Think.⁸

II. Barriers to Rational Preference.

Barriers to rational preference include nonrational elements in the individual, such as bias, prejudice, apathy, etc. The human mind demonstrates frequently a profound inability to determine values and to agree upon how their impact should be weighted. To analyze rationally a complex policy system, the individual must determine his preferences among the different outputs of the system. He must decide what weight he chooses to assign the factors of extent, time, cost, and concomitants or consequents. In a multiple goal systems approach, the advocate must establish further the relative importance of his several stated objectives. For it is only with such determinations

that rational choice can be made between two alternatives with differing outcomes. Unless these goals are logical derivations of a well-defined, ranked set of prior values, weights cannot be determined rationally. Rather their importance depends upon the subjective perceptions of the observer. The derivation of outputs for a complex policy system, and the determination of preference, is not an exact process.

In analyzing the effects of a given alternative, the advocate must deal in the realism of uncertainty and contingency, confronting facts and theories that are often unknown and sometimes unknowable. And in choosing among systems that affect different goals, the advocate has no objective means of choosing among these goals. Objectives are expressed as normative statements; they suggest what the decisionmaker should consider doing or how he should behave. The problem is that human scholarship has failed to determine a means of establishing objectively normative criteria. Preferences among goals depend upon the subjective preferences of the individual. Analysis of goals can become rational only when the individual establishes a set of weighted preferences. It should be recognized, however, that establishing a set of weighted preferences does not necessarily make the determined weights infallible. On the contrary, the facts which comprise the weights are the essence of the dispute and the debate. Inferences rather than absolutes are essential for a variety of reasons.

A. Information Gap.

The calculation of the output of a complex policy system is itself uncertain and contingent. The arguer must deal with facts and theories that are often controversial, sometimes unknown, and occasionally unknowable.

1. Information. Often crucial information relevant to the policy system is unavailable. Furthermore, this information may be controversial. The observer is often selective in his recording of phenomena, and his perception of these phenomena may be influenced by his perceptions and biases.

2. Theories. The theory necessary to order this information may be in dispute or may be unknown. With minor modifications, which are a natural result of the growth of new and potentially divergent theories of argumentation, it is possible for convergence that would provide a virtually universal paradigm, however. For example, the null hypothesis does not assign explicitly and automatically a presumption in favor of counterplans.⁹ On the contrary, that is a contention which can and should be argued in the context of the debate when the issue arises. At that time the evaluator or decision-maker has the option and opportunity of making judgments and weighting relative strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives suggested on the basis of the degree of risk and uncertainty as they have been

argued in the debate. Short of this process, the resolution should be nullified. When the affirmative meets its burden of proof, the burden of refutation falls upon the negative to reinforce its hypothesis with substance in order to carry forward the debate and advance the argumentation so essential to its process.

Thus, when issues such as this one are argued, the outcome is based upon the theoretical and substantive arguments within the debate rather than upon the theoretical presuppositions of anyone outside the debate. It is through dialectic rather than polemic that external theoretical controversies of this kind must ultimately coalesce and gain concurrence in belief or action. James F. Klumpp stated this observation well in the following words:

Finally, I believe that the way a critic-judge comes to terms with the debate which he judges is a mixture of these paradigms....Debate involves hypothesis testing as long as it centers on a proposition. The differences between the paradigms ought not to block understanding of their similarities.¹⁰

David Zarefsky elaborates:

The belief that prediction is less logically certain than verification, even if true, might not justify the belief that a case relying on prediction poses a less significant reason for change. Obviously, logical

certainty is but one variable to consider in choosing between alternatives. Keynes, for example, notes that "of two hypotheses it may be rational to act on the less probable if it leads to the greater good. We cannot say more at present than that the probability of a hypothesis is one of the things to be determined and taken account of before acting on it." Value judgments must be made in choosing among alternatives; in certain situations one might deem the risk of a less-probable action to be justified by the good to be obtained if the action succeeds.¹¹

Zarefsky's example illustrates the importance of multiplying the probability that a given outcome will occur times the significance of its impact if it does occur before arriving at a decision as to which policy alternative is the more advantageous. It is only through this approach to the comparison of policy alternatives that rational decisionmaking is possible. Zarefsky explains in these words:

This line of argument would seem to suggest that a predictive argument might be more significant than a verifiable one. At any rate, we cannot justifiably presume its significance to be less.

One might argue that, despite a superficial dichotomy, prediction and verification are not fundamentally different

in kind. Both rely on probabilities. If the analytic argument is based on authoritative testimony, the testimony is subject to the familiar vagaries of source bias, lack of sufficient familiarity with the problem, ignorance of relevant information, and the like. If it is based on statistical data, it is subject to sampling errors, bias induced by the behavior of the enumerator, the operation of extraneous variables, and so on. This is not to impugn these analytic methods, but to suggest that verification does not necessarily yield certainty. Probability still rules.¹²

It may well be that the proper combination and application of divergent paradigms disprove an absolute understanding of John Von Neumann's thesis which suggests that it is impossible to maximize simultaneously the values of two different variables because at some point it is necessary to sacrifice one for the other, or to compromise on the part of each. Rather it is quite possible that the theory of policy systems debate produces a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Dispute over policy resolutions simply requires the advocate to combine and apply paradigms in a clear and consistent way as the government must do in its determination of public policy and in its application of the law. For example, the

government is not allowed to take an inconsistent position such as prosecuting for possession, yet opposing a motion to suppress on grounds that the defendant had no interest in the property. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951).

3. Causality. Argument seeks to answer the causal relationship among phenomena. Nevertheless, unknown variables may be operating on the system, resulting in spurious relationships.

In public debate the term "inherency" may have little meaning for the audience.¹³ Here it is important to understand that probability is inherency, and that in policy argument probability serves as a more meaningful form of causality analysis than does the traditional notion of inherency. Furthermore, the probability oriented concept of inherency relates to existing barriers and the likelihood that a particular result or objective would occur given their elimination. The utility of an advantage would entail an assessment of the impact of a variety of causes which might reduce the aggregate significance to be accrued from the adoption of the proposal for change. According to Zarefsky: "In short, causal arguments direct one toward examination of the potentialities of both existing and proposed courses of action."¹⁴

Zarefsky contends further that: "The inapplicability of the scientist's concept of causation does not render all forms of causation inapplicable to policy argument." Rather than diminishing the role

of causal argument in policy questions, an application of probability and decision theory to policy debate enhances the ability of the advocate's proposal to overcome both the known and the unknown defects of a system regardless of the extent to which it has been tried and tested. Consequently, in the advocacy of policy change, an analysis of probable advantages is merely an inverted form of causal determination which neither burdens the advocate with the responsibility of proving the impossible nor encourages the advocate to ignore the possible.

Just as the comparative advantage constitutes a more sophisticated, inverted need,¹⁶ so too the probable effects of a proposed policy system constitute more sophisticated, inverted inherency and causality for the latter serve as their basis. Under none of these approaches is the burden of proof upon the advocate increased or decreased as compared to the other approaches. The only difference is one of form, structure and method.¹⁷

The issue of inherency is the very essence of policy systems debate for it is on the basis of causation by correlation and inference that probabilities and weights are calculated and conflicting goals are compared, measured and evaluated to provide significance and impact in policy determination. The weights can be assigned by means of a number of processes, including that of hypothesis testing, the data-warrant-claim process of laying out arguments,¹⁸ or the syllogistic approach to developing arguments. In any event, the issue is one of

establishing to whatever extent possible the relative weights to be placed on the probability and impact of competing policy systems.

The proof of causal claims involves establishing known defects in the system, and weighing them in light of unknown defects and probable effects. Empirically verifiable relationships must be considered in light of relationships not even potentially susceptible to empirical verification. Tempering such known and unknown relationships and defects must of necessity call for the art of persuasion as well as for logic, for any viable solution must gain audience or constituency acceptance in order to prove effective and succeed in its practical application.

Indeed, the need for efficacy oriented solutions does not preclude addressing causal connections; nor does it limit proposed solutions to problems the causes of which can neither be verified empirically nor isolated precisely. An objective audience is the first to accept such reasonable constraints upon the advocate for the audience is the decisionmaker.

4. Prediction. The arguer seeks to develop policy for the future, but unpredictable changes may occur which alter the outcomes of his policy system.

B. Inherent Limits of Man.

The task of the advocate is to attempt to make some sense of this "booming, buzzing uncertainty". Within a limited time frame,

he must try to make a coherent, persuasive presentation of his point. In the process, it is impossible for him to rely solely upon logical construction, although logic remains his most fundamental tool. First of all, a policy system is not a formal system in which all relationships are defined by set rules, which if applied properly yield a definite answer. Secondly, the argument is not being evaluated by a computer machine, but by a human being who is necessarily affected by psychological factors. Argument, then, is a process which attempts, in human terms, to deal with uncertain propositions.

III. Argument and the Rational Ordering of Uncertainty.

Argumentation promotes rationality in preference expression, and thus facilitates the rational ordering of uncertainty. Both by establishing the format of discussion, and in the course of discussion itself, argument establishes areas of agreement. Only in this way is there a basis for clash. This clash, or the issues which emerge from it, develops into an analysis of the implications of these common ideas. The process is accomplished in the following way:

A. By Identifying Areas of Agreement.

The processes of agreement and dispute are dynamic. New areas of agreement are secured, and issues evolve. In this way an increasingly sophisticated analysis of the policy question should be created. As long as change is universal, nothing can be known with certainty.

However, because the nature of many scientific phenomenon involve so many units behaving in a statistically defined fashion, a measure of certainty can be achieved. Yet in social systems this degree of certainty can rarely be achieved. Generally, fewer units are being considered, and their units behave in a much less predictable fashion.

B. By Isolating Areas of Disagreement.

Areas of disagreement are motivated by dispute over value as well as fact. Argumentation becomes involved with normative questions. In argumentation the advocate is seeking not only to describe events, but also to motivate action. While the advocate is encouraging the audience to change its belief or to take certain action, human scholarship has not yet developed a means of establishing objectively the criteria refined sufficiently for making decisions on a totally objective standard.

C. By Offering Quasi-Logical Arguments.

Quasi-logical arguments attempt to break the stasis and define areas of disagreement. Since argumentation employs the method of causal analysis, in analyzing policy systems it seeks to identify and evaluate the causes of certain phenomenon. Unless these causal relations are discovered, the policymaker has no means of gauging the outcome of any action. Nevertheless, causal analysis is always contingent because there may be unknown variables operating upon the system and producing spurious relationships.

D. By Seeking to Predict the Outcome of Future Events.

Not only does argumentation attempt to uncover existing causal relationships, but it further attempts to predict the outcome of future events and to determine why circumstances have been altered unpredictably. This element alone renders debate a contingent process. Since argumentation generally involves complex questions of policy, and since much of the information relevant to these questions is unknown and unknowable, the theories which link together the information are controversial and undeveloped.

E. By Allowing the Audience to Check the Method of the Advocate.

The audiences of the advocate play a key role in insuring that argumentation will be rational. These audiences have been discussed in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric.¹⁹

1. The Advocate as Audience. Debate within one's own mind enables the individual to identify and confront those elements of his argument that derive from his personal, psychological make-up. It further enables the advocate to subject his argument to rigorous logical analysis, and to avoid self-deception by recognizing and eliminating those contentions which the debater himself knows are fallacious. The debater speaks to himself with some degree of objectivity, but there is no strong internal check on rationalizing.

Everyone is a product of environment and heredity, and past conditioning will color almost everything we think or do. Debate within oneself is absolutely essential because psychological factors

paradoxically impel one to ignore rational considerations. Debate within oneself is a means of confronting those elements of argument that derive from psychological needs. It also encourages the individual to subject his argument to rigorous logical analysis and to gauge its effects on his hearers by scrutinizing its effect upon himself. Internal discourse is also a way of involving the individual in the argument and motivating him to seek additional information and ideas.

2. The Opponent as Audience. The introduction of an opponent renders the argument more reasonable and informative because the debater does not wish to humiliate himself before his antagonist. Not only is non-rational, uninformed argument the subject of ridicule, but it will rarely serve to validate the individual's contention in light of his opponent's objections. Competition serves as a spur to further research and analysis so that the arguer strengthens his contentions and assails those of his opponent more forcefully.

3. The Judge as Audience. Just as the presence of an opponent tends to make the individual more rational in his presentation, so the presence of a third party, a critic evaluator, still further enhances the chances that the argument will be rational. Knowing that his ideas are being evaluated and that a critical decision will be rendered, the advocate is constrained to be more objective and honest than he may be inclined to be with himself alone or even with his

opponent. As with the two other audiences, the third party, which can be virtually unlimited in number as an immediate audience, operates as a potent motivating force to research and analysis. The larger the third party audience, the more potent is its force upon the advocate, and the more its influence may modify, refine and improve upon his position. Indeed, the audiences act to check nonrational thought by exposing the advocate to possible ridicule and by exposing the advocate to competition.

4. The Whole World as Audience. The hypothetical, universal audience is simply an extension of the immediate audience. A speech or debate may be published at some future time or rebroadcast at another time or in another location. In any such case the arena for potential criticism, exposure or complaint is extensive. The larger it is, the more the advocate must guard against faulty reasoning and appeals to vested interests at the expense of sound logic and understanding. The more self-serving the advocate, whether to himself or to an immediate audience, the more likely a universal audience is to check such future occurrences and expressions of poor judgment.

The discussion of the audiences assumes that the opponents are of nearly equal skill, and that the judges are individuals who reflect a high degree of objectivity and dispassion. These characteristics are ideals that, while never wholly attainable, should constitute the standard toward which all people will strive. Characteristics

of the idealized advocate and judge should include objectivity, an informed and knowledgable position, an intellectually competent and honest individual who is schooled in the process of argumentation, including theories of presumption and burden of proof, and an understanding of the obligation to carry forward one's argument.

Conclusion

Argumentation is generally limited by considerations of time. The disputant does not have unlimited scope to develop his contentions. As a result, the evidence he presents is selective and his logical connections abbreviated. The very nature of the information employed by the debater is controversial. David Hallet Carr calls history a "dialogue between past and present". Yet any unearthing of information in the social sciences, and perhaps even in the physical sciences, is a dialogue between the observer and the event. Not only must the observer select what information percolates through his understanding, but how he is influenced by his preconceptions and biases.

Deceived by the superficial differences of style and presentation between public debate and competitive debate, critics have often suggested that training for competitive debate is inappropriate for a more general format, and that tournament debaters may not be effective in public debate. These critics have fashioned factors such as speed of delivery, presentation, quantities of evidence, compactness of terminology, and lack of ethos and pathos as reasons for their lack of effectiveness.

They ignore, however, the more fundamental consideration that rigorous training in competitive debate demands a mastery of the logic of policy choice. Unlike matters of style and delivery, an application of the logic that has been explicated in this work does not vary from one forum to another. With appropriate modification of presentation, the competitive debater can use this logic in public advocacy, both as a persuasive device and as a means of educating general audiences in the logical requirements for deciding among competing policy alternatives.

Results of empirical studies showing the impact of the policy systems approach, in contrast to the persuasive impact of other paradigms, upon audiences would be interesting and perhaps enlightening. Unfortunately, however, the layout of the methodology in such a study would preclude the conceptual development embodied in this article for reasons of space constraints. Hopefully, the framework discussed here will serve as a stepping stone to encourage many rigorous studies of this kind and their publication in future issues of scholarly journals.

Furthermore, in addition to the theory expounded here, it is the intent of this work to suggest that rationality is a higher value to be pursued by the advocate to the greatest extent possible. The fact that differing people use logic and rationales in differing ways enhances the logical clash that is the goal of argumentation and

debate. This tension was stated well by Joseph Joubert when he said: "It is better to debate a question without settling it than to settle a question without debating it."²⁰

Traditional argumentation and debate has at least attempted to appeal to the rational inclinations of mankind, or to pursue rationality as the essence of its method. If it has failed in its purpose, that is good reason for changing the method rather than for abandoning logic as its goal. It is only with the onset of policy systems debate that this goal has been questioned and challenged.²¹ During the period of time when our country came into existence, constitutional and revolutionary rhetoric, such as that found in the Federalist Papers and in the works of Peter Zenger, concentrated its appeals upon the higher, rational instincts of an intelligent and educated individual. In light of the advances in science and technology, as well as in our basic educational systems which have developed since that time, should the purpose of argumentation and debate be to do less today?

Endnotes

1. American Forensic Association Debate Program and Debate Tournament Standards for Colleges and Universities," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VIII (Summer 1971), 44.

2. "Minutes of the 29th Annual American Forensic Association Business Meeting, Dec. 1, 1977," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIV (Winter 1978), 172.

3. A. Craig Baird, Argumentation, Discussion and Debate (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 38; also see Douglas Ehninger, "Debating as Critical Deliberation," Southern Speech Journal, XXIV (Fall 1958), 22-30; Douglas Ehninger, "Debate as Method: Limitations and Values," Speech Teacher, XV (September 1966), 180-185; Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Rationality and Rhetoric in Philosophy," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXXIX (December 1973), 381-389; Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1963), viii, 16-17; Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy (Allyn and Bacon, 1964), 4-6.

4. Gerald H. Sanders, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Skills in Argumentation and Logic," SCA National Convention (December 1974), 12.

5. For documentation concerning the role of probability in decision theory, see Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A General Theory of the Counterplan," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XII (Fall 1975), 70-79. By decision theory we mean not only methodologies for organizing a given set of facts and assumptions into a rational choice, but also the means by which those inputs are derived. For documentation in regard to the probability times significance formula, see Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A General Theory of the Counterplan," in David A. Thomas, ed., Advanced Debate (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975, revised edition, 1979), 168-181.

6. Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), 12.

7. Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "Role of the Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of Academic Debate," in Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1970), 20-61.

8. John Dewey, How We Think (London: D. C. Heath & Co., 1909), 72-78; also see H. S. Thayer, The Logic of Pragmatism (New York: The Humanities Press, 1952), 49-69; Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), 276-280; Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1947), 66-71.

9. See David Zarefsky, "A Reformulation of the Concept of Presumption," Central States Speech Association Convention (April 1972); Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth Through Hypothesis Testing," SCA National Convention (December 1974); David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis-Testing," SCA National Convention (December 1976); David Zarefsky, "Inherency: The Continuing Vitality," Southern Speech Communication Association Convention (April 7, 1978).

10. James F. Klumpp, "Debate as a Paradigm for Comparing Alternative Policy Options," SCA National Convention (December 1974), 13-14.

11. David Zarefsky, "The 'Traditional Case'--'Comparative Advantage Case' Dichotomy: Another Look," Journal of the American Forensic Association, VI (Winter 1969), 17.

12. Ibid, 17-18.

13. For a definition of one classic notion of inherency, see ibid, 13. This definition is refined further in David Zarefsky, "The Role of Causal Argument in Policy Controversies," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Spring 1977), 184-191; also see Richard Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, "Inherency as a Multidimensional Construct: A Rhetorical Approach to the Proof of Causation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIV (Fall 1977), 82-90.

14. Zarefsky, ibid, 191.

15. Ibid, 180.

16. In his article on the comparative advantage case, op. cit., 19, Zarefsky suggests that: "For universality, inherency, and significance, if they are to be upheld as standards at all, by logic apply to either type of affirmative case, regardless of its label."

17. For further reading on this subject, see James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis on Argumentation Theory," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XI (Summer 1974), 1-7; Tom Goodnight, Bill Balthrop and Donn W. Parson, "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," Journal of the American Forensic Association, X (Spring 1974), 231-240. Klumpp has attempted to reconcile the similarities between inherency and probability determination, as has Zarefsky in his two articles noted above.

18. See Stephen Edelston Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: University Press, 1964), 1-264; Ehninger and Brockriede, op. cit.; Wayne Brockriede, Where is Argument? Journal of the American Forensic Association, IX (Spring 1975), 179-182; Daniel J. O'Keefe, "Two Concepts of Argument," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Winter 1977), 121-128; Wayne Brockriede, "Characteristics of Arguments and Arguing," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIII (Winter 1977), 129-132; Charles Arthur Willard, "On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments," Communication Monographs, XXXXIII (1976), 308-319; Brant R. Burleson, "On the Real Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments: A Reply to Willard and Substantive Extension," SCA National Convention (Nov. 4, 1978); Dale Hample, "The Toulmin Model and the Syllogism," Journal of the American Forensic Association, XIV (Summer 1977), 1-8; Jimmie D. Trent, "Toulmin's Model of an Argument: An Examination and Extension," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV (Oct. 1968), 252-259.

19. Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 1-566.

20. See Joseph Joubert, Broadcasting (Oct. 30, 1978), 38-39.

21. See, for example, reactions following the presentation of the 1978 SCA Convention paper, upon which this article is based. Audio tapes of the program are available in the SCA National Office.